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The Constitutional Significance of the
Discriminatory Effects of At-Large
Elections
Equal protection doctrine since Washington v. Davis' has focused on
discriminatory intent rather than discriminatory effect. The discrimina-
tory effects of an official action remain useful in proving that a discrimi-
natory purpose motivated the official action.2 Discriminatory effects also
have independent significance in equal protection cases, however. Plain-
tiffs challenging an at-large electoral scheme3 under the equal protection
clause must prove that official action to establish or maintain the at-large
system was motivated by a discriminatory purpose and has resulted in a
current discriminatory effect. Current equal protection doctrine, however,
does not adequately define discriminatory effect in the electoral context. In
Rogers v. Lodge,4 the most recent Supreme Court decision applying the
discriminatory purpose standard in an equal protection challenge to an at-
large system, the Court found an aggregate of circumstantial evidence suf-
ficient to support an inference of purposeful discrimination behind the
maintenance of the at-large system. But because the decision hinged to a
great extent on the Court's deference to the concurrent findings of fact of
the district court and the court of appeals," the Court did little more than
restate the findings below and did not state what discriminatory effects are
necessary, at a constitutional minimum, to satisfy the discriminatory effect
component of a purposeful discrimination claim in the electoral context.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. Compare Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3279-81 (1982) (discriminatory purpose inferred
from circumstantial evidence) with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73-74 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting inference of discriminatory purpose based on similar circumstantial evidence). See
infra notes 23-30.
3. Voters in a multimember district elect more than one representative to a governmental body.
Where voting occurs "at large," all voters in the multimember district may vote for candidates for all
available positions in any given election. By contrast, under a single-member district system, voters are
divided into as many separate districts as there are seats on the elected body.
4. 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
5. Id. at 3279-81. The Court found the following factors probative of intent: racial bloc voting, id.
at 3279; complete lack of representation for a substantial voting minority, id.; past discrimination,
3279-80; unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority interests, id. at 3280 n.9; depressed socio-
economic status of blacks, id. at 3280; subversion of a neutral state policy for invidious purposes, id.;
and various structural components of the electoral system, id. at 3280-81. These factors closely track
the factors that Congress has deemed probative of a finding of discriminatory result of an electoral
scheme under § 2 of the amended Voting Rights Act. See S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28
(1982).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 3278-79.
At-Large Elections
Under current equal protection doctrine, an at-large system 7 is uncon-
stitutional only if it has both a discriminatory purpose8 and a discrimina-
tory effect. This Note will argue that an at-large system has a discrimina-
tory effect if it diminishes the ability of minority voters9 to elect
representatives of their choice. 0 The Note proposes that either of two con-
ditions, racially polarized voting patterns or a lack of proportional repre-
sentation, is sufficient to raise a presumption of discriminatory effect.
When concurrent, these conditions conclusively prove the existence of dis-
criminatory effect. Although several lower courts have relied heavily on an
alternative test for discriminatory effect-the unresponsiveness of elected
officials to minority interests tt-this Note suggests that "unresponsive-
ness" is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for showing that an
electoral system has a discriminatory effect.
I. The Discriminatory Effect Requirement
An electoral system violates the equal protection clause only if it was
established or maintained for a discriminatory purpose and has a current
discriminatory effect. Existing equal protection doctrine fails to define this
discriminatory effect requirement.
7. This Note focuses on the use of at-large electoral systems to elect local officials or state legisla-
tors. The possible discriminatory effect of referenda or of electoral schemes for electing single candi-
dates to such offices as President, governor, or congressman lies beyond the scope of this Note.
8. Proof of discriminatory purpose is the most difficult hurdle minority plaintiffs face when they
challenge at-large electoral schemes under the Equal Protection Clause. See Parker, The Impact of
City of Mobile v. Bolden and Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting Rights Cases in Its Wake,
in TIlE Ri(;liT TO V(YE 107 (Rockefeller Found. Conf. Rep. 1981) (noting enormous significance of
Bolden discriminatory purpose requirement); ef The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV.
75, 149 (1980) (Bolden "decreased the likelihood" of plaintiff success). The adverse impact of Bolden
on minority plaintiffs has been mitigated by the holding in Rogers v. Lodge, see infra pp. 978-80, and
by the extension and amendment of the Voting Rights Act. The revised § 2 of the Act now permits a
finding of illegal discrimination in voting rights based on discriminatory "results." Discriminatory
intent need not be proven. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1982).
9. This Note addresses the discriminatory effects of at-large electoral systems on racial and ethnic
minorities. It does not discuss potential constitutional voting rights claims of other groups, such as
women, political parties, or religions. Because the overwhelming majority of constitutional and statu-
tory voting rights cases have involved blacks, this Note treats blacks as the paradigm in assessing the
discriminatory effect of at-large electoral schemes.
10. See infra pp, 981-82, 987-88. Numerous other definitions of voting power have been proposed
by scholars. See, e.g., Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man,
One Vote" Principle? 75 YALE, L.J. 1309 (1966) (using mathematical model to demonstrate that
discriminatory effect of multimember legislative districts is caused by unequal distribution of ability to
cast tie-breaking votes); Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHI".S 375, 377-85 (1981)
(listing many definitions of political equality).
11. See, e.g., Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 922-24 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2933 (1982); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981), afl'd sub noma.
Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383, 1383 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452, 460-61 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
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A. A Discriminatory Effect is a Necessary Element of a Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause
In Washington v. Davis," which held that only those official actions
taken with a discriminatory purpose violate the equal protection clause,
the Supreme Court noted that current discriminatory effect caused by the
challenged official action is an "essential element" of an equal protection
claim.1 3 Similarly, in school desegregation cases, the Court has clearly
stated that past discriminatory plans must continue to have a discrimina-
tory effect (segregated schools) in order for plaintiffs to state a valid cause
of action under the equal protection clause."' In the voting context, if acts
taken with a discriminatory purpose are unsuccessful in that they fail to
create a discriminatory effect,"5 or if their impact is so diminished over
time by changing socioeconomic conditions or demographic or voting pat-
terns that no vestiges of the acts remain to injure plaintiffs, 6 then those
12. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. Id. at 240. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979) (suggesting Washington
v. Davis held that "disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate"). But ef City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 140 n.39 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The plurality does not
address the question whether proof of discriminatory effect is necessary to support a vote-dilution
claim."); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975) (dictum) (discriminatory effect
may be unnecessary for a valid constitutional claim if discriminatory purpose can be proven); Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976) (dictum) (absence of retrogressive effect on racial mi-
nority of reapportionment plan does not preclude finding of unconstitutionality).
14. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); id. at 490-91 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 198, 205-06 (1973); Eisenberg, Disproportion-
ate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 44
(1977) ("Keyes held that both intentional discrimination and adverse impact must be proven."); cf
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton 1) (describing lower courts'
duty to determine whether school board's action was "intended to, and did in fact, discriminate against
minority pupils, teachers, or staff").
15. Cf United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 n.24 (1977) (plurality opinion) (sug-
gesting plaintiffs' case would have failed had they been unable to show that the purposeful gerryman-
der would have effect of diluting the value of their votes); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58
(1964) (discriminatory effect on blacks of congressional redistricting in doubt due to presence of blacks
on both sides of the case).
16. Cf Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-11 (1973) (remoteness in time does not
excuse actions taken with segregative intent, if segregation resulting from those actions continues to
exist); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 252 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (former segregative
acts have no significance if no substantial impact of those acts remains to injure plaintiffs), aIfd, 443
U.S. 449 (1979).
Moreover, if an at-large system established or maintained for a discriminatory purpose has no
discriminatory effect, then plaintiffs may suffer no injury and thus lack standing to sue in federal
court. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (injury to plaintiff necessary to satisfy Article
III standing requirement); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 495-96 (1974) (past injuries insuf-
ficient to confer standing to seek injunctive relief "if unaccompanied by any continuing, present ad-
verse effects"); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) ("some threatened or actual
injury resulting from the putatively illegal action" necessary to confer standing); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1252 n.139 (1970) (discrimi-
natory impact necessary to vest standing). But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)
(standing granted for indirect and speculative future harms); infra pp. 977-78 (stigmatic harm may be
judicially cognizable injury).
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acts do not violate the Constitution.'7 Furthermore, because the scope of a
remedy may not exceed what is necessary to remove the effects of a consti-
tutional violation,'" courts must precisely identify those discriminatory ef-
fects resulting from discriminatorily motivated official action.
Although equal protection doctrine requires identification of the effects
of actions motivated by a discriminatory purpose, it is unclear what types
of conditions resulting from illicitly motivated official action are required
to satisfy the "discriminatory effect" element of an equal protection viola-
tion.'9 One widely held view suggests that stigma is "the core of harmful
discrimination."20 Supreme Court decisions suggest, however, that stigma
17. See, e.g., Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 925 (4th Cir. 1981) ("impact or effect must be
established as an essential element of [Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment] claims [of vote dilution]"),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2933 (1982); McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1248 (5th Cir.)
(at-large system unconstitutional if adopted or operated for discriminatory purpose and has discrimi-
natory effect), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case
settled); Bolden v. City of Mobile, No. 75-297-P, slip op. at 50 (S.D. Ala. April 15, 1982) (on
remand) (plaintiffs must prove discriminatory purpose and "present adverse affects [sic]").
18. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (Dayton 1) (court must
tailor scope of remedy to fit nature and extent of constitutional violation); Austin Indep. School Dist.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 995 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[TIhe extent of an equitable
remedy is determined by and may not properly exceed the effect of the constitutional violation.");
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1976) (district court exceeded author-
ity by enforcing desegregation order after constitutional violation fully remedied); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 738, 744-45 (1974) (Milliken 1) (interdistrict remedy inappropriate absent finding of
interdistrict violation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (nature
of violation determines scope of remedy).
Limitations on remedies apply with special force where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to restruc-
ture or eliminate an important local institution. In Bolden, Justice Blackmun voted to reverse both
courts below on the ground that the district court's remedy-substituting a mayor-council plan using
single-member districts for the three-member commission elected at-large-exceeded the extent of the
constitutional violation. 446 U.S. at 80-83 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result). See Kirksey v.
City of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282, 1311 (S.D. Miss. 1978) (federalism discourages federal court
from restructuring state-created municipal electoral system), vacated, 625 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1980).
19. This effect requirement has not played an important role in the Court's major discriminatory
purpose cases to date, both because the effects of the challenged actions in those cases were starkly
obvious and because, prior to Rogers v. Lodge, the Court's inquiries had ended with a finding that the
intent requirement had not been satisfied. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3279-81 (1982)
(racial bloc voting, past discrimination, abject poverty, and electoral rules caused election of all-white
county commission that was unresponsive to black interests); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp.
384, 388-92 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (noting presence of racially polarized voting, unresponsiveness of com-
missioners to black needs and interests, and absence of black representation on city commission), rev'd,
446 U.S. 55 (1980) (evidence insufficient to support finding of intent to discriminate); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 260 (1979) (noting "devastating impact" of veterans' preference on
women's state civil service employment opportunities, but held, no intent to discriminate against wo-
men); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255-59 (1977)
(zoning ordinance prohibiting multi-family dwellings resulted in virtual exclusion of racial minority
groups, but held, no intent to discriminate); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976) (black
applicants failed written test at a rate four times that of white applicants, but held, no intent to
discriminate).
20. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 235 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1978) (Nevett fl) (Wisdom, J., specially
concurring). See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-27
(1960) (implication of inferiority caused by segregation is "hurtful to human beings"); Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8-12 (1976) (stigmatic injury violates antidiscrimination principle even where material harm
seems slight or problematic); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158-59 (1955) (official
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may not be sufficient to satisfy the discriminatory effect requirement. 21
Therefore, plaintiffs will stand on surer ground if they can adduce evi-
dence of discriminatory effect that is more concrete than stigmatic harm.22
B. Current Equal Protection Doctrine Does Not Define Discriminatory
Effect in the Electoral Context
The Supreme Court has yet to outline clearly the role of discriminatory
effects of an electoral system within the discriminatory purpose frame-
work. Prior to Bolden, challenges to the constitutionality of at-large elec-
toral systems focused on the discriminatory effects of those systems. 3 In
humiliation "psychologically injurious and morally evil"); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-11
(1977) (equal citizenship principle guards against imposition of stigma); Perry, Modern Equal Pro-
tection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030-32, 1050-51 (1979)
(moral irrelevance of race). Under this view, actions taken with a discriminatory purpose inflict stig-
matic harm, and thus proof of discriminatory purpose creates a presumption of discriminatory effect
that satisfies the effect requirement of an equal protection claim.
21. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J.) (equal
protection clause not framed in terms of stigma); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26
(1971) (illicit legislative motivations do not alone violate equal protection).
But on other occasions, members of the Court have emphasized the significance of stigma to an
equal protection claim. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion) (purposeful racial gerrymander that "represented no racial slur or stigma" to any race did not
violate equal protection); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 266-68 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)
(stigmatic harm caused by closing of city pools following desegregation decree violative of Fourteenth
Amendment); cf City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1613 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(symbolic harm judicially cognizable).
22. The stigma attached to past official actions taken with discriminatory intent may also dissipate
as the more tangible effects of those actions dissipate. Moreover, since "stigma" is not objectively
measurable, it is highly manipulable, and courts have few standards by which to judge whether a
given official action causes stigmatic harm. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
294 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stigma reflects standardless subjective judgment with no clearly defined
constitutional meaning). Compare City of Memphis v. Green, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1600-01 (1981) (clos-
ing of street through historically all-white neighborhood merely an "inconvenience" and a "routine
burden of citizenship") with id. at 1614 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same street closing "a badge
or incident of slavery forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment").
23. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-67 (1973) (holding at-large system unconstitutional
without expressly requiring showing of discriminatory intent); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,
149 (1971) (lack of proportional representation of minorities not a constitutional violation unless they
had less opportunity than others "to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice"); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (at-large system may be unconstitutional
if "designedly or otherwise" it operates to minimize or cancel out minority voting strength); Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (Fortson standard satisfied by proof of an "invidious effect"); S.
REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1982) (prior to Bolden, plaintiffs could have prevailed
upon showing of effect or intent).
For proof of effect, the Court demanded that plaintiffs show "real-life impact," Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 146 (1971), not hypothetical or purely mathematical impact. See White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144-46 & n.23 (1971)
(rejecting mathematical theory showing how multimember districts create unequal distribution of abil-
ity to cast tie-breaking votes); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) ("[s]peculations' and
"conjecture" no substitute for "demonstrated fact"); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1965).
See also Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 48 (7th Cir. 1975) ("actual impact on voters' rights must
be demonstrated"); Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th Cir.) (rejecting predictions of plain-
tiffs' political expert), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
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Bolden, the plurality extended the discriminatory intent requirement of
Washington v. Davis to the electoral context. 24 The plurality stated that
the discriminatory effect of an at-large system, no matter how severe, does
not alone violate the Equal Protection Clause.25
The Bolden plurality's piecemeal treatment of each element of plain-
tiffs' circumstantial proof26 and the plurality's resulting refusal to draw an
inference of discriminatory purpose suggested that it would be difficult for
plaintiffs to win an at-large "vote dilution" case on equal protection
grounds without direct evidence of the subjective intent of the relevant
decisionmakers.27 In Rogers v. Lodge, however, the Court upheld an in-
ference of discriminatory purpose in the maintenance of an at-large sys-
tem based on circumstantial evidence alone.28 On facts strikingly similar to
those in Bolden,21 the Court reached the opposite result, this time profess-
24. 446 U.S. at 66-67 (plurality opinion); accord, Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982) (vote
dilution claim subject to standard of proof generally applicable to equal protection cases).
25. 446 U.S. at 70. The plurality reasoned that a number of facially race-neutral "good govern-
ment" rationales can easily justify the use of at-large systems. Id. at 70 & n.15. See Washington v.
Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2933 (1982); Kirksey v. City
of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1981); cf Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44, 51-53 (7th Cir.
1975) (Pell, J., dissenting) (giving history of commission form of government). Recent scholarship,
however, has questioned the ostensible "good government" motives behind the implementation of at-
large electoral systems during the Progressive Era. The municipal reform movement may have been
designed "to develop and insulate the power of emerging metropolitan elites from sustained pressures
from the masses as expressed in machine politics." M. SciiESI., TIlE POLITICS" OF EFFICIENCY 192
(1977) (footnote omitted). But see Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 534 F. Supp. 1351, 1352-53 (N.D.
Miss. 1982) (rejecting plaintiffs' expert historian's view that adoption of commission form of govern-
ment was racially motivated). See generally B. RICE, PRO(;RE-SSIVE CITIES 78 (1977) (municipal re-
form movement a power struggle between white "business elites" and ethnic, minority, and working
class groups that derived political power from ward system). The discriminatory effect of many "good
government" reforms is well-documented in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 105-06 n.3 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing six recent empirical studies).
26. 446 U.S. at 73-74 (plurality opinion). See id. at 102, 103 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing
plurality for viewing in isolation each element of plaintiffs' proof of intent).
27. But see, e.g., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 207 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting prior
to Rogers v. Lodge that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove discriminatory intent behind
maintenance of at-large system).
28. Prior to Rogers v. Lodge, the Court adverted to the value of evidence of discriminatory effect
in proving discriminatory purpose, see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (plurality
opinion); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274, 279 n.24 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (impact evidence "may provide
an important starting point" for proof of intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)(discriminatory purpose may be inferred from "totality of the relevant facts"), but, outside the school
desegregation context, the Court generally permitted inferences of discriminatory purpose only in
those special cases where starkly disproportionate impacts could not be rationalized by any legitimate
state policy. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (inferring discriminatory purpose
from disproportionate impact of Texas keyman jury system); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970)
(same inference drawn from system for selecting school board members); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (inferring discriminatory purpose from overwhelming statistical disparity in
application of facially neutral statute). But see, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
463-65 (1979) (inferring segregative intent of school board from its actions having foreseeable dispa-
rate impact).
29. Both cases involved racial bloc voting in an at-large system established in 1911, resulting
without exception in all-white elected commissions that were unresponsive to the black community.
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ing reluctance to overturn the concurrent findings of two lower courts.3" In
repeating with approval the factors that the courts below had found pro-
bative, the Court did not indicate what quantum of "discriminatory ef-
fect" evidence is necessary either (1) to permit an inference of discrimina-
tory purpose or (2) to satisfy the discriminatory effect requirement of an
equal protection claim if direct evidence of intent exists' or if an inference
of discriminatory purpose can be drawn from circumstantial factors other
than "impact" evidence.32 Nor did the Bolden plurality reach the issue of
what constitutes the discriminatory effect of an at-large system," because
the plurality ruled that plaintiffs' case failed for lack of adequate proof of
discriminatory purpose.34
The content of this effect requirement was the subject of considerable
confusion in the federal courts prior to Rogers v. Lodge. Lower courts
differed over whether proof of the unresponsiveness of elected officials to
minority needs and interests constituted a necessary element of an equal
protection cause of action. For example, a Fifth Circuit panel in Lodge
v. Buxton36 stated that in constitutional "vote dilution" cases, the unre-
sponsiveness' of the governing body is a necessary, but not sufficient, ele-
ment of the plaintiffs claim.37 The Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge,
Both jurisdictions had relatively recent histories of official discrimination in many areas, and both had
voting rules, such as a majority-vote requirement and numbered posts, that disadvantaged voting mi-
norities. Approximately one-third of the registered voters in both jurisdictions were black.
30. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3278-79 (1982). Such solicitude for the findings of lower
courts was absent from the Bolden reversal of the district court and Fifth Circuit decisions.
31. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th Cir.) (discriminatory
motives for change to at-large system expressed by two city council members), appeal dismissed sub
nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled).
32. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977) (listing circumstantial factors probative of intent). It is not necessary to prove any specific
combination of the Arlington Heights factors to permit an inference of discriminatory purpose. Thus,
proof of the non-impact Arlington Heights factors could lead to a finding of discriminatory purpose in
the absence of the first factor-impact.
33. But cf 446 U.S. at 140 n.39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discriminatory effect requirement
satisfied by retrogression in the minority's voting power when an electoral scheme is enacted with a
discriminatory purpose, or by submergence of "minority electoral influence below the level it would
have under a reasonable alternative scheme" when an electoral scheme is maintained for a discrimina-
tory purpose).
34. Id. at 70-74 (plurality opinion).
35. Compare Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981) (proof of unresponsiveness of
elected officials a necessary element of plaintiffs' prima facie case), afPd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge,
102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982) and Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 923-24 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1981)
(absent.direct denial of voting rights, unresponsiveness necessary for proof of discriminatory effect),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2393 (1982) with McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1248-49
(5th Cir.) (responsiveness irrelevant to proof of discriminatory purpose or effect of electoral system),
appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled). See
generally McDonald, Response, in TIlE RIGHT TO VOTE 94-96 (Rockefeller Foundation Conf. Rep.
1981) (sharply criticizing "unresponsiveness" requirement); Note, Affirmative Action and Electoral
Reform, 90 YAI.- L.J. 1811, 1822 n.69 (1981) (describing two possible theories of impact require-
ment of equal protection).
36. 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981), afld sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
37. 639 F.2d at 1374, 1375 & n.35. See Cross v. Baxter, 639 F.2d 1383, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1981)
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while affirming the Lodge v. Buxton finding of discriminatory purpose,
correctly rejected the short-lived unresponsiveness requirement. The Su-
preme Court in Rogers v. Lodge also contradicted the Bolden plurality in
noting that evidence of unresponsiveness, like other discriminatory effects,
is probative of discriminatory purpose."
While unresponsiveness is clearly not a necessary element of proof of
discriminatory effect of an electoral system, the Court has offered little
guidance as to what minimal discriminatory effect is required in an equal
protection challenge to an electoral system. This effect requirement is less
important where the discriminatory effect of official action is powerful
enough, as in Rogers v. Lodge, to support an inference of discriminatory
purpose. The content of this effect requirement would be more important
where discriminatory intent could be proven with non-impact evidence. 9
In the latter case, a discriminatory effect must be proven not to demon-
strate the presence of discriminatory intent, but only to establish that the
plaintiffs were actually harmed by the illicitly motivated official action.
II. Alternative Definitions of Discriminatory Effect
Discriminatory effect is, generally, the withdrawal of a benefit from or
imposition of a burden on a specific class of persons." In the electoral
context, the relevant benefit or burden must be defined by a theory of
representation. In evaluating the effect of a discriminatorily motivated
electoral system, a court must refer to the benefits typically derived from
representative government. If an electoral system denies some portion of
those benefits to members of a particular group, then the system has a
(lack of unresponsiveness dispositive). See also Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 923 n.9 (4th Cir.
1981) (unresponsiveness necessary for proof of discriminatory effect), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2393
(1982).
Because 76% of the municipalities in the "Solid South" (Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C.,
S.C., Tex., & Va.) employ at-large elections for city council, see Sanders, Governmental Structure in
American Cities, in 1979 MUNICIPAL Y.B. 97 n.2, 99 (Table 4.), the Lodge v. Buxton rule threatened
to have a significant impact on constitutional challenges to at-large systems. Of the states included in
the "Solid South," all but Arkansas (8th Cir.) are within federal circuits bound by precedents handed
down by the Fourth or Fifth Circuits, both of which had used the Lodge v. Buxton "unresponsive-
ness" standard. Alabama, Florida, and Georgia are in the recently formed Eleventh Circuit, which is
bound by Fifth Circuit precedents.
38. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3280 n.9 (1982) (dictum) ("[Ulnresponsiveness is an im-
portant element but only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider in determining
whether discriminatory purpose may be inferred.") Cf City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73-74
(1980) (plurality opinion) (evidence of unresponsiveness "relevant only as the most tenuous and cir-
cumstantial evidence" of discriminatory purpose).
39. See supra p. 980 & notes 31-32 (possibility of proof of discriminatory intent independent of
"effect" evidence).
40. See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (equal treatment requires
equal distribution of some opportunity, resource, or burden); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 141 (1976) (criterion innocent on its face may nonetheless disad-
vantage minorities); Note, supra note 35, at 1822 n.69.
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discriminatory effect.
The Constitution does not, of course, embody a single theory of repre-
sentation to which all electoral systems must conform.41 Consequently,
courts have encountered a number of pitfalls in their attempts to define
discriminatory effect in this context. Some courts have invoked theories of
representation that rest on empirically invalid assumptions,42 while others
have relied exclusively on one theory and have ignored benefits possible
under competing theories.4 13 This Note proposes a definition of discrimina-
tory effect that is both comprehensive and properly less stringent than
those requirements derived from prior definitions.
A. Theories of Representation that Courts Currently Use to Define Dis-
criminatory Effect Are Inadequate
Courts have used a number of theories of representation to define the
discriminatory effects of electoral schemes in adjudicating constitutional
challenges to those schemes. The two primary theories em-
ployed-Madison's theory that the presence of many factions will prevent
majority tyranny and the theory that representation exists only to ensure
responsive governments-are both inadequate.
4
1. Madisonian Theory of Faction
In The Federalist, Madison posited that majority tyranny is unlikely in
a large, diverse electorate composed of many different factions.45 Madison
assumed that transitory majorities are built from coalitions in flux across
issues and over time. Majority tyranny against any faction of substantial
size is unlikely, under Madison's theory, because the factions composing
the temporary majority realize that the factions excluded from the coali-
41. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (multimember legis-
lative districts not per se unconstitutional); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154-55 (1971) (lack of
proportional representation of an interest group not unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 579 (1964) (single-member, multimember, and floterial districts permitted); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 302 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth Amendment provides no guide on
issues concerning representation); cf Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (proportional representation systems violate "principle of equality" and the "democratic
ideal").
42. See infra p. 984 & note 51.
43. See supra pp. 980-81; infra pp. 984-86.
44. Each of these theories deserves special attention. The Madisonian theory of faction is an im-
portant justifying principle for the American constitutional system, see infra pp. 982-83 & notes 45-
46, and courts have continued to apply Madison's theory even where the assumptions are empirically
invalid. See infra pp. 983-84. The "unresponsiveness" requirement was a source of conflict in the
lower federal courts as they grappled with the ambiguities of Bolden. See supra note 35.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 135 U. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (the more factions re-
quired for a majority, the less likely it is that the majority will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens). See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 40-42 (1968). But cf R.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 30 (1956) (noting inconsistencies in Madison's theory).
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tion may be the necessary element of some future winning coalition. All
groups of substantial size could expect to be "courted" by other factions
seeking to build a majority.
Under certain circumstances, Madison's theory of factional politics re-
mains persuasive today. If coalition-building occurs freely across racial
lines, a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority may have as
much political influence in an at-large system as in a single-member dis-
trict system." But when the minority faction is a "discrete and insular"
minority that is consistently excluded from the coalition-building process,47
the ostensible protection against majority tyranny provided by Madison's
theory evaporates. In a race-conscious polity in which a bloc-voting major-
ity consistently votes against and thereby defeats minority candidates or
candidates representing minority interests, 48 minority voters who support
minority candidates will have no influence on the outcome of an election.4 9
46. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 219 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Under . . . [an at-large] system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all officers; under
* . . [a single-member district system], minority groups have more influence in the selection of fewer
officers") (quoting Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
deleted by Rehnquist, J.). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964) (minority plain-
tiffs and intervenors disagreed over desirability of concentrating minority voters in a few districts);
Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 13-9, at 759 (1978) (difficult to gauge "the relative value of having one ardent spokesman or
many mildly sympathetic listeners in the legislative halls"). But see Note, supra note 35, at 1813 n.15
(discussing benefits to minorities of concentration in a few districts). Concentration of a minority
group in a single-member district may, however, segregate the group by preventing coalition-building.
See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-73 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(preferential districting could be "contrivance to segregate"); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139, 161 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (Hill, J., dissenting) (questioning advantages to blacks of "safe"
black districts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
47. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 122 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dominant
political factions can ignore discrete and insular electoral minorities); Derfner, Multi-Member Dis-
tricts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120, 127 (1972) (difficulty in forming coalitions isolates minor-
ity from political process); Fiss, supra note 40, at 152 (coalition-building difficult for blacks, because
they have been "subjects of fear, hatred, and distaste"). It is proper for courts to show a special
solicitude for those "discrete and insular minorities" that are shut out of the pluralist political process.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 151 (1980).
Some jurists and commentators, however, claim that the black struggle for political recognition and
responsive governments is no different from the struggle undertaken by white ethnic minorities. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978) (Powell, J.); J.Q. WILSON, NEGRO
POLITICS 24 (1960). But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Mar-
shall, J.) (Negro experience different in kind, not just degree); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 126 (2d ed. 1980) (caste-like status of blacks excludes them from political "give and take");
W. NELSON & P. MERANTO, ELECTING BLACK MAYORS 18-20 (1977) (criticizing "ethnic analogy").
48. See infra note 77 (racial bloc voting not uncommon). Black interests often diverge widely from
white interests on many political matters, not just those relating directly to race. See G. POMPER,
VOTERS' CHOICE 131-32 (1975).
49. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (change to at-large elections
could nullify the ability of minority voters "to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohib-
iting some of them from voting"). Single-member districting in the same polity would not give a
minority control over the governing body. Single-member districting could, however, give a geographi-
cally insular minority of sufficient size control over the election of a proportion of candidates equal to
the minority's proportion in the overall population.
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Even in situations where the Madisonian assumption of fluid electoral
coalitions is invalid due to voting along racial lines, ° some courts have
nonetheless continued to apply the Madisonian theory of faction to con-
clude that it is indeterminable whether the minority will receive greater
benefits from a multimember, at-large system or from a single-member
district system.' To continue to apply the Madisonian theory in a po-
larized setting ignores that under an at-large system, but not under a sin-
gle-member district system, the minority will be unable to elect represent-
atives of its own choice. 2
2. Governmental Responsiveness to Minority Needs and Interests
Courts have also examined the responsiveness of officials elected under
an at-large system to determine whether a challenged electoral system has
a discriminatory effect.53 Courts usually measure the responsiveness of an
elected body to the interests of its minority constituents by searching for
discrimination in the elected body's allocation of government services, jobs,
and appointments. Prior to the extension of the intent requirement in
Bolden, unresponsiveness often played a key role in constitutional tests of
at-large electoral schemes."5 After Bolden and prior to Rogers v. Lodge,
50. Modern explanations of a properly functioning pluralist democracy are, like Madison's the-
ory, invalid for those who are excluded from the political process. See R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 54 (3d ed. 1976) (theory of polyarchy does not apply to excluded groups, mainly
blacks); T. LOWi, THE POLITICS OF DISORDER 32-35 (1971) (static groups prevent coalition-build-
ing). But cf Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30-31 ("realistic analysis" of political process indicates that blacks,
like other minorities, are able to procure policies in their favor).
51. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 185, 186-87 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (rejecting notion that whites and non-whites form "homogeneous entities," despite pres-
ence of racial bloc voting); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1978)
(questioning benefit to black minority of concentration of voting power, despite a "high rate" of racial
bloc voting); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 155-56 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Gee, J.,
specially concurring) (lamenting pro-minority gerrymandering leading to "a tribal, rather than a re-
publican, form of government," despite severe racial bloc voting) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977).
52. See infra pp. 987-88.
53. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-70 (1973) (unconstitutionality of at-large system
due to several factors, including representatives' lack of good faith concern for minority interests);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 155 (1971); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1973) (en banc), afl'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). These cases were decided under what appeared to be an equal protec-
tion "effects" standard. See Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Prob-
lem, 10 GA. L. REV. 353, 379-87 (1976) (discussing importance of responsiveness under pre-Bolden
"effects" standard); supra note 23 (Court emphasized discriminatory effects in pre-Bolden vote dilu-
tion cases).
54. See, e.g., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1981) (examining public
schools, county hiring and appointments, and road paving), aftd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S.
Ct. 3272 (1982); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 389-92 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (examining
public employment, city committees, public works, road paving, sidewalks, and parks and recreation),
rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
55. See cases cited supra note 53.
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some courts required proof of unresponsiveness as a necessary element of
an equal protection challenge to an at-large electoral system. 6
Rogers v. Lodge properly rejected the Lodge v. Buxton unresponsive-
ness requirement.17 The unresponsiveness requirement is based on an in-
adequate theory of representative government. 8 Such a requirement im-
plies that an electoral system adequately represents minority constituents
as long as the elected officials provide the minority with governmental
services and jobs equivalent to services and jobs provided to majority con-
stituents.5 9 Such a theory would condone benign dictatorships." If official
action taken for a discriminatory purpose results in the dilution or elimi-
nation of minority voters' power to elect candidates of their choice, the
absence of other discriminatory effects, such as unresponsiveness, should
not preclude a finding of an equal protection violation.6' Even if non-
minority officials elected under a purposefully discriminatory electoral sys-
tem prove that they are responsive to minority needs, such a system denies
minority voters those benefits available to them in a system in which they
are able to elect representatives of their choice. 62
56. See, e.g., Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 923-24 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2933 (1982); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1374, 1375 & n.35 (5th Cir. 1981), affd
sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982). See supra notes 35-39 & pp. 980-81 (discussing
confusion surrounding Lodge v. Buxton "unresponsiveness" requirement).
57. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3280 n.9 (1982) (dictum) (unresponsiveness not essential,
but rather "only one of a number of circumstances a court should consider" as proof of discriminatory
purpose). The Lodge v. Buxton unresponsiveness requirement was all the more surprising and inap-
propriate considering the Bolden plurality's treatment of evidence of responsiveness. See City of Mo-
bile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion) (unresponsiveness is "tenuous and circum-
stantial" evidence of discriminatory purpose).
58. At times courts have been reluctant to find a constitutional basis for choosing among compet-
ing theories of representation. See, e.g., Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d 1191, 1197 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981)
(questioning whether courts should choose among competing theories of representative government);
see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300-02 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth
Amendment "provides no guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem"). But ever since
Baker v. Carr removed the "political question" roadblock to federal court challenges to the structure
of state and local electoral systems, the federal judiciary has had the responsibility to make "at least
some hard substantive decisions of political theory." L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 13-7, at 750 n.4.
59. See H. EULAU & K. PREWITT, LABYRINTHS OF DEMOCRACY. ADAPTATIONS, LINKAGES, REP-
RESENTATION, AND POLICIES IN URBAN POLITICS 438 (1973) ("core issue in representation is not how
leaders are chosen . . . but whether they are responsive").
60. Contentment of the governed should not be sufficient to define representation. See C.
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 8-9 (1970) (only effective electoral power can
ensure responsiveness); H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 230-34 (1967) (benevolent
dictatorship not a representative government). According to Pitkin, a representative government must
be defined by long-term systematic arrangements, such as free and genuine elections, that institution-
alize responsiveness. See H. PITKIN, supra, at 234.
61. Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14
(1977) ("A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act . . . would not necessarily be immu-
nized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.")
62. See McDonald, supra note 35, at 97 ("[Elqual political participation means vastly more to a
race of people and to constitutional analysis than garbage collection and street paving."); Note, supra
note 35, at 1813-14 & nn.15-20; infra p. 988. Under the "unresponsiveness" requirement of Lodge v.
Buxton, elected officials could thwart otherwise valid equal protection claims simply by providing
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An unresponsiveness test has practical drawbacks. Evidence of unre-
sponsiveness is often difficult and expensive to collect."3 Furthermore, be-
cause the court is likely to have no "good government" standard against
which to compare the defendant government's performance,64 the degree of
responsiveness of a government to the interests of a minority group may
be indeterminate.
B. Diminution of the Minority's Ability to Elect Candidates of Its
Choice Constitutes the Discriminatory Effect of an At-Large Electo-
ral System
Members of a racial minority may form a majority of voters in a dis-
trict under a single-member district scheme, 6  but form only a minority of
effectively disfranchised minorities with municipal services equivalent to those provided to whites. See
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306-07 n.26 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (if absence of unre-
sponsiveness foreclosed constitutional claim, "the voting strength of minorities could be freely diluted
without fear of constitutional restraint"), atfd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); McDonald, supra note 35, at 95-96 (likening
the Lodge "unresponsiveness" requirement to the "separate but equal" analysis of Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
The Lodge v. Buxton panel may have intuitively believed that an actively discriminatory govern-
ment is bound to result from a purposefully discriminatory electoral system, and that the absence of
the former precludes a finding of the latter. For like reasoning, see Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F.
Supp. 1282, 1313 (S.D. Miss. 1978) (lack of unresponsiveness "weighs heavily against an inference of
intentional discrimination"), vacated, 625 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1980). But the majority might desire a
discriminatory electoral system not so that elected officials could actively discriminate against minori-
ties, but rather to withhold from minorities the symbolic and tangible benefits that result from the
election of minority group members to office. See G. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY 280 (1981)
(nonwhite suffrage a symbolic issue); infra p. 988. The Lodge v. Buxton and Kirksey v. City of
Jackson courts failed to distinguish the harm to minorities from a discriminatory electoral process and
the harm to minorities from discriminatory actions by government officials. A constitutional attack on
an at-large system challenges the means for electing representatives, not the performance of those
representatives once in office. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73-74 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
63. See Avila, Mobile Evidentiary Analysis, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE 135 (Rockefeller Founda-
tion Conf. Rep. 1981) (amassing voluminous proof of unresponsiveness drains scarce litigation re-
sources); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 29-30, Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981) (on
file with the Yale Law Journal) (proving unresponsiveness element of an equal protection challenge
to an at-large system could comprise many separate full-scale discrimination suits), afi'd sub nom.
Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
64. Cf. Bonapfel, supra note 53, at 379-87 (detailing divergent treatment of unresponsiveness
evidence); Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1577,
1599 (1970) (search for unresponsiveness "at best subjective, qualitative, and uncertain" (footnote
omitted)). Standards under which courts have evaluated the responsiveness of elected officials to the
needs of a minority group have varied widely. Compare Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626,
632-36 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (finding unresponsiveness despite governing body's "mixed" record in equal
provision of government services) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306 n.26 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc) (finding at-large system unconstitutional despite complete absence of proof of unre-
sponsiveness), atfd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Mar-
shall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) with David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1977) (remanding
for further factual findings despite district court findings of no black policemen or firemen in a city
that is 28% black, dilapidated housing, poor enforcement of building codes, and inferior streets in the
black area).
65. Courts have dismissed challenges to at-large systems where blacks constituted such a small
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voters in a multimember district that utilizes at-large voting. Because of
the prevalence of residential segregation," minorities are likely to form a
higher percentage of the electorate in certain single-member districts than
in an at-large district. In an at-large system, minority voters may be una-
ble to elect a candidate of their choice.
67
This Note proposes that the potential benefit of representative govern-
ment denied to a minority group by an at-large system is the ability to
elect a representative of the group's choice.68 Thus, an at-large system is
unconstitutional if adopted or retained for a discriminatory purpose and if
it diminishes the minority's ability to elect representatives of its choice.69
percentage of the voting population that an at-large system would have no "'actual impact' on the
plaintiffs' voting power." Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790, 790-91 (4th Cir.) (blacks, comprising only
5.8% of voters, not entitled to representative on five-person county board), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936
(1975). But even if blacks do not form a large enough group in a single district to elect a candidate
with only black votes, an at-large system with racially polarized voting might still have a discrimina-
tory effect relative to the single-member district plan if voting is less polarized in their single-member
district than in the at-large district as a whole. The less racially polarized the voting, the greater are
minority opportunities to form decisive biracial coalitions. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
105 n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (greater degree of bloc voting leads to greater minority vote
dilution in multimember district).
66. See REPORT OF TIlE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMIISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 242-50 (Bantam
ed. 1968); Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transi-
tion, 90 YALE L.J. 377, 377 & nn. 1-2 (1980) (residential segregation a fact of urban life in modern
America).
Although often present, geographical concentration of the minority group is not a necessary element
of an equal protection violation. Presence or absence of identifiable minority neighborhoods will, how-
ever, affect the type of remedy chosen to erase the effects of a violation. Where the minority is geo-
graphically concentrated, courts can remedy the effects of a constitutional violation by ordering a
conversion from an at-large system to a single-member district system. If the minority is not geo-
graphically concentrated, a change to a single-member district system generally will not benefit the
minority. In such cases, other structural remedies might be appropriate. These possible remedies in-
clude a change to proportional, limited, or cumulative voting, or elimination of either a majority-win
requirement, see infra note 104 (defining majority-win requirement), or an anti-single shot voting
rule, see infra note 106 (defining anti-single shot provisions). See generally Note, supra note 35, at
1817-18 (listing structural measures for increasing minority representation).
67. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3275 (1982) (distinct minority may be able to elect
several representatives under a single-member district system, but may be unable to do so under an at-
large system); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (change from district to at-
large voting could reduce or entirely eliminate minority voters' ability to elect a candidate of their
choice "just as would prohibiting some of them from voting"); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675
F.2d 201, 203 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (describing vote dilutive effect of at-large elections).
68. This discriminatory effect can exist even in municipalities in which white officials are respon-
sive to minority interests, if the minority community would prefer to be represented by a minority
group member. Cf City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 218 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (blacks expressed preference for black representatives, despite responsiveness of white officials).
69. The Supreme Court has used a similar definition of discriminatory effect under the pre-clear-
ance provision of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See, e.g., City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183, 185 (1980) (finding that changes in at-large system with a
bloc-voting white majority would dilute black voting strength and "depriv[e] Negroes of the opportu-
nity to elect a candidate [of their choice]"); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021,
1029 (D.D.C. 1972) (annexation to city with racial bloc voting in an at-large system that "impair[ed]
the ability of blacks to elect candidates of their choice" had discriminatory effect), atfd mem., 410
U.S. 962 (1973); cf Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggre-
gate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 588-89 & n.99 (1978) (minority group access to legislative
representation is fundamental to significant political participation).
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The ability to elect minority representatives provides minority voters
with substantial benefits.70 Minority representatives serve as spokesmen
for minority interests within the decisionmaking body7 and may act as a
check on discriminatory rhetoric," assumptions, and actions by members
of that body. In addition, they serve as role models for minority group
members." Minority representatives can also increase minority pride, po-
litical consciousness, participation, and identification with the govern-
ment.74 Finally, they can erode harmful stereotypes concerning the natural
or proper role of minorities in politics.75
III. Implementing the Proposed Definition of Discriminatory Effect
This Note proposes two evidentiary criteria for determining whether a
given at-large system frustrates the ability of a minority to elect candidates
of its choice and therefore has a discriminatory effect. These criteria are:
(1) racially polarized voting patterns in the at-large system,76 and (2) less
70. See L. COLE, BLACKS IN POWER 221-23 (1976) (summarizing support for position that "the
election of blacks makes a difference"). But see United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951,
956 (5th Cir. 1978) (election of blacks has limited significance); Karnig, Black Representation on City
Councils: The Impact of District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223, 236-39
(1976) (unclear whether black presence in elective office makes a difference); Morris, Black Electoral
Participation and the Distribution of Public Benefits, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE 176 (Rockefeller Foun-
dation Conf. Rep. 1981) (high expectations about benefits of electing blacks to office often "sets the
stage for swift and deep disillusionment").
The importance to blacks of electing black candidates is strongly indicated by the persistent and
varied attempts by whites to minimize black political strength. These attempts have included intimida-
tion, disenfranchisement, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, gerrymander-
ing, and structural devices. See Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523, 533-44, 552-60 (1973); Note, supra note 35, at 1815 & nn.27-32.
71. See L. COLE, supra note 70, at 152 (white elected officials may vote for measures that they
would not have thought to introduce); L. TRIBE, supra note 46, § 13-8, at 750 n.2 (having a voice in
the legislative body has value independent of the minority's ability to cast a deciding ballot, due to the
potential for persuasion).
72. Cf Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact at 11-12, Lodge v. Buxton,
No. CV 176-55 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (ex-commissioner testified that all-
white commissioners used term "nigger" in city commissioner meetings), aff'd, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th
Cir. 1981), afi'd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
73. Gf L. COLE, supra note 70, at 109, 112 (black role model important for whites as well as
blacks).
74. See id. at 108-10 (blacks identify with black elected officials); C. PATEMAN, supra note 60, at
43 (participation aids acceptance of collective decisions); U.S. COMN'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOT.
ING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 63 (1981) (lack of blacks in municipal office in near-majority
black town created apathy and hopelessness among blacks); Hamilton, Response, in THE RIGHT TO
VOTE 191 (Rockefeller Foundation Conf. Rep. 1981) (presence of blacks in office signals to blacks
that the system is legitimate and ought to be supported); Note, supra note 35, at 1813-14 & nn.15-20
(listing benefits to minority of electing more minority legislators); Note, supra note 69, at 590 n.106
(increased black representation reduces black alienation, thus reducing incidence of violence and pro-
test born from frustration).
75. Cf. R. DIXON, supra note 45, at 469 ("Getting 'one of their own' into high political office has
long been viewed as the final token [sic] of full integration of ethnic minorities into American soci-
ety."); Morris, supra note 70, at 175 (symbolic value of blacks in office).
76. Although court opinions often mention the phenomenon of racial bloc voting, they frequently
refer to its presence or absence without precisely explaining either the concept itself or how the court
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than proportional representation of the minority group on the elected
body. If either polarized voting patterns or underrepresentation is present,
a discriminatory effect should be presumed. A defendant should be given
an opportunity to rebut this presumption, however. Where the two condi-
tions exist concurrently, discriminatory effect is conclusively proven.
A. Racially Polarized Voting Patterns
1. Relevance to Proof of Discriminatory Effect
Racial bloc voting17 in an at-large system with a majority-win require-
ment indicates that minority voters are unable to elect representatives of
their choice.78 Voting is sufficiently polarized to cause the at-large system
to have this discriminatory effect79 if a percentage of white voters large
enough to constitute a majority of the electorate casting ballots votes con-
sistently against, and thus defeats, black candidates.8 0 A finding of po-
larized voting is not, however, limited to situations where the majority
bloc comprises only white voters. Rather, some black "crossover" voters
made its finding. See, e.g., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981), afi'd sub nom.
Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership v. City of Shreveport,
71 F.R.D. 623, 628-29 (W.D. La. 1976), remanded, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978). But see McMil-
lan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 n.6 (5th Cir.) (detailed analysis of racially polarized
voting), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled);
City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1007 n.136 (D.D.C. 1981) (lengthy review of
expert testimony on racially polarized voting), prob. juris noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982).
77. Racial bloc voting is a recurring phenomenon in many jurisdictions. See United Jewish Orgs.
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1977) (plurality opinion) (voting for or against a candidate because
of his race "is not rare"); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)
(racial bloc voting is a "fact of life"); Note, supra note 69, at 589 & n.102 (statistical studies show
that voters tend to cast ballots along racial lines and that race is a more important factor than class).
78. Courts have recognized that racial bloc voting by a white majority in an at-large system causes
the system to have a discriminatory effect. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3275 (1982) ("The
minority's voting power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs
. ... ); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 213 (8th Cir. 1982) ("virtually impossible"
for black candidates to win in at-large system with bloc voting); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership
v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248, 255-56 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (bloc-voting
white majority "makes it a foregone conclusion that at-large voting has discriminatory effects"); Hen-
drix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 629 (M.D. Ala. 1978); cf. Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152,
1155-56 (8th Cir. 1976) (at-large system has no discriminatory effect without polarized voting).
79. A court hearing a constitutional challenge to a proposed change from a single-member district
system to an at-large system should not have to wait for elections to occur to conclude that the pro-
posed system has a discriminatory effect. The court could, instead, perform a hypothetical, forward-
looking analysis into the discriminatory effects of the proposed change, similar to judicial inquiry
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). But cf.
supra note 23 (in constitutional cases courts have demanded that discriminatory effects be real, not
theoretical).
80. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 n.6 (5th Cir.) (noting "estab-
lished pattern of sufficient polarized voting to regularly defeat black candidates"), appeal dismissed
sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled). For example, in an at-large
system with an electorate that is 75% white and 25% black, if two-thirds or more of the white vot-
ers-50% of the voting electorate---consistently vote against black candidates, then those candidates
cannot win.
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may join the white bloc to form a majority against black candidates. In
such situations, courts may still find polarized voting, if a politically cohe-
sive bloc of black voters voted for the defeated black candidates."1 Where
white voters alone consistently form majorities against black candidates,
black votes become irrelevant to electoral outcomes, and thus proof of
black electoral cohesion is not necessary to prove that voting is sufficiently
polarized to cause the at-large system to have a discriminatory effect.12
The presence of blacks in office does not prove that black voters are
able to elect candidates of their choice. Where an overall pattern, albeit
with exceptions, of racially polarized voting exists, only black candidates
who have received the majority "seal of approval" can be elected.83 Black
candidates must, under such circumstances, moderate their stands on is-
sues of particular importance to blacks in order to gain the support of
needed white voters.84 For this reason, even where the minority has
achieved proportionate representation on the governing body,85 courts can
still presume the discriminatory effect of an at-large system from the exis-
tence of a fairly consistent pattern of racially polarized voting. 6
Many circumstances exist in which a bloc-voting white majority and its
political leaders and organizations can thwart genuine minority choice de-
spite the election of minority candidates." For example, a white-controlled
81. If some black voters cross over and vote for white candidates, then fewer white voters need to
vote for white candidates to defeat black candidates. At a certain point, enough black voters cross over
so that they no longer form a cohesive voting bloc and are therefore not harmed, as a class, by the
white bloc vote. No a priori cut-off point for minimal minority cohesion can be established. Rather,
district courts must make such intensely factual appraisals on a case-by-case basis.
82. Black cohesion is irrelevant in such a situation, because black voters may well have adapted to
the impossibility of electing black candidates. This adaptation could take the form of voting for white
candidates or simply not registering or voting. See infra pp. 995-96.
83. If voting is racially polarized in an at-large system, only those minority candidates who cater
to and are accepted by white political groups can escape defeat by the white bloc vote. See Avila,
supra note 63, at 133.
84. Cf. Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. L. REV. 85,
88 (1979) (blacks who appeal to the white majority "are often not the most effective advocates of
black interests").
85. See Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139, 149 n.21 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (election of
black candidates not dispositive on issue of black voting strength), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (success of black candidates
does not foreclose constitutional challenge to at-large electoral system), afl'd per curiam on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
86. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1978) (Nevett I1) (racially polarized voting
found where six of seven black candidates in 1968 won city council seats, and all eight black candi-
dates in 1972 lost).
87. Majority support for certain minority candidates in specific elections leading to proportional
representation for the minority should not foreclose a finding of discriminatory effect. Otherwise,
courts would be inviting attempts to thwart potentially successful constitutional challenges to purpose-
fully discriminatory at-large systems by electing minority candidates to office. See Zimmer v. Mc-
Keithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom.
East Carrol Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). But see id. at 1310 (Coleman, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that the election of three blacks in two years under the at-large system
foreclosed finding that black voting strength had been cancelled or minimized).
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slating organization might hand-pick minority candidates or at least regu-
late their flow onto the ballot." Alternatively, in many at-large systems,
the only minority candidates ever elected or re-elected are those the major-
ity-dominated governing body has appointed to fill vacancies.8 Such en-
dorsement by majority leaders may "cue" the majority electorate to the
acceptability of the minority candidate. 0 Finally, in multimember districts
with primary elections in each sub-district, but with an at-large general
election, the bloc-voting white majority may vote for what it sees as the
"lesser of two evils"-the black nominee who received the least support
from the black voters in the primary.91
2. Measuring Racial Bloc Voting
Statistical evidence of polarization is obtained by comparing voting re-
sults between precincts or wards that are racially homogeneous.92 The
comparison is usually performed for elections in which a minority candi-
date opposes a white candidate.93 Racial bloc voting may be immediately
obvious from an examination of voting returns."
Voting polarization is clearest where a percentage of the voters in
88. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973) (only two blacks elected since Re-
construction were also the only two blacks ever slated by white-dominated Democratic Party slating
organization); Avila, supra note 63, at 133 (citing cases involving discriminatory slating groups).
89. E.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.6 (5th Cir.) (two appointed
blacks were sole exceptions to pattern of black candidate defeat by white bloc vote), appeal dismissed
sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled); Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d
1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 1976) (black appointed to fill vacancy became only black ever elected).
90. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.6 (5th Cir.) (noting how endorse-
ments from white community leaders defused the normal white bloc vote against black candidates),
appeal dismissed sub noma. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled). In a
racially polarized community, black candidates who are acceptable to the white majority tend not to
be effective advocates of black interests. See supra p. 990 & notes 83-86. But cf. Dove v. Moore, 539
F.2d 1152, 1153, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 1976) ("substantial and crucial" white voter support for previ-
ously appointed black candidate precluded finding of racial bloc voting).
91. Sloan, "Good Government" and the Politics of Race, 17 SOC. PROB. 161, 167 (1969) ("the
evidence suggests that strong support in [primary election in the black candidate's] home district is the
political kiss of death" in the general election) (emphasis deleted).
92. E.g., MeMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.6 (5th Cir.) (calculating statistics
from precincts that were 95% or more of one race), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v.
Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987,
1007 n.136 (D.D.C. 1981) (calculating polarization statistics from precincts that were at least 90%
white or 90% black), prob. juris noted, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982).
93. See, eg., cases cited supra note 92; cf. Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1213
n.52 (D.D.C. 1980) (questioning probative value of county's polarized voting data based on elections
involving only white candidates). But c Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (S.D.
Ala. 1976) (noting polarization in elections between two white candidates, where one candidate was
identified with black interests), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
94. See, e.g., City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 & n.10 (D.D.C. 1972)
(inferring city-wide racial bloc voting from extremely polarized election returns from two nearly all-
black wards and two nearly all-white wards), arid mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973). See also Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978) (Nevett DI) (racial bloc voting may be indicated by
"consistent lack of success of qualified black candidates").
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"white" precincts sufficient to constitute a majority of the voting electorate
consistently vote against minority candidates.95 Even where the white bloc
vote alone does not form a consistent majority to defeat minority candi-
dates, polarization can frequently be measured by correlating the percent-
age of registered minority voters in a precinct with the percentage of the
vote minority candidates received in that precinct. 96 The higher the corre-
lation, the more severe the racially polarized voting.
If the white bloc vote alone does not determine electoral outcomes, sub-
stantial crossover voting by either race reduces the likelihood of a finding
of racially polarized voting by reducing the correlation between the race of
the voters and the vote received by candidates of that race.97 Defining a
cut-off point below which correlations will not indicate racially polarized
voting is necessarily arbitrary."
Where voting results by precinct are not available, an analysis of over-
all election results may demonstrate a pattern of polarized voting.9 This
might occur, for example, where a black candidate wins a plurality in a
95. See supra pp. 989-90 & notes 79-80 (polarized voting due to bloc-voting white majority).
96. E.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.6 (5th Cir.) (racial bloc voting
found, based on "very high correlation" between percentage of blacks in a precinct and number of
votes a black candidate receives in that precinct), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of Pensacola v.
Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 402 F. Supp. 658, 672
n.4 (S.D. Miss. 1975) (correlations close to unity provided "persuasive" evidence of racial bloc vot-
ing), rev'd on other grounds, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). See
City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226 n.36 (D.D.C. 1979) (correlation method surest
way of demonstrating racial bloc voting), all'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); City of Port Arthur v. United
States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1007 n.136 (D.D.C. 1981) (computing "polarization score" for "white
versus black" elections by subtracting percentage of votes cast for a black candidate in 90% white
precincts from percentage of votes cast for that candidate in 90% black precincts), prob. juris noted,
102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982). See generally J. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 179-84
(1982) (describing use of correlations in voting rights litigation).
More sophisticated statistical analyses have also been used to demonstrate correlations indicating
racial bloc voting. See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (S.D. Ala. 1976)
(regression analysis using votes received by candidates as dependent variable and race and income as
independent variables), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
97. If the white majority votes only for white candidates and some blacks cross over and vote for
whites, the correlation could be relatively low and yet blacks would nonetheless be unable to elect
candidates of their choice. See infra pp. 995-96 (underrepresentation alone creates presumption of
discriminatory effect due to adaptive behavior of black minority in an at-large system). If the black
minority votes only for black candidates and whites cross over and vote for blacks, a finding of racial
bloc voting sufficient to foreclose the black bloc from electing candidates of its choice can be made
unless enough whites vote with the black bloc to form a winning coalition behind black candidates.
See supra p. 990. Of course, actual voting behavior will always fall between these two polar examples
of pure bloc voting by either race. Courts must rely on correlation statistics, which by definition reflect
crossover voting by either race, and other evidentiary sources to determine the severity of racial bloc
voting.
98. Cf Note, supra note 69, at 599 (suggesting that Congress should therefore create rules defin-
ing bloc voting).
99. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978) (Nevett II) (racial bloc voting
may be indicated by "consistent lack of success of qualified black candidates"); City of Rome v.
United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 & n.36 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding substantial degree of racial
bloc voting even though returns were no longer available or could not be broken down by district),
alfd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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general election but loses in the runoff election,' 0 or where a black candi-
date wins the primary from a black sub-district but loses in the at-large
general election.
Plaintiffs are not, however, limited to the use of statistical analysis to
demonstrate racial bloc voting. Reference to the local political, historical,
and socioeconomic context can help to support a court's finding of suffi-
cient polarization to cause an at-large system to suppress a minority's
ability to elect candidates of its choice.' 0 ' Statistics must be evaluated in
their full factual context and in light of the testimony of voters, elected
officials, and experts from relevant disciplines.' 2
An at-large system may possess certain structural features that will
help determine whether racial bloc voting is sufficiently substantial to
cause an at-large system to diminish the ability of a minority to elect can-
didates of its choice. These structural features enable relatively slight de-
grees of racial bloc voting in an at-large system to decrease a minority's
opportunity to elect candidates of its choice.'03 These factors include ma-
jority-win requirements,104 numbered posts,105 anti-single shot (full slate)
100. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 & n.20 (1980) (black candidate won
plurality of votes against three white opponents in general election, but lost run-off election due to
racial bloc voting).
101. Cf Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977) (usefulness of statistics depends on
surrounding facts and circumstances).
102. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.20 (1980) (black citizens believed
they could not win under current electoral system); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp.
987, 1007 n.136 (D.D.C. 1981) (conflicting expert testimony on polarization), prob.juris. noted, 102
S. Ct. 1272 (1982); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 468 F. Supp. 285, 291-93 (S.D. Miss.) (expert
testimony), appeal dismissed per curiam, 608 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423
F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (practically all candidates testified that a black could not be
elected under at-large system), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
103. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3287-88 & n.22 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cer-
tain structural features of at-large system "[made] it especially difficult for a minority candidate to
win an election"); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 106 n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(majority-vote, numbered-post, and staggered-term requirements "exacerbate the vote-dilutive effects
of multimember districting"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (such factors enhance the
opportunity for racial discrimination); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (these factors enhance circumstantial proof of vote dilution), arfd per curiam on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). But cf. City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion) (these structural factors "naturally"
disadvantage any voting minority and are "far from proof" of purposeful racial discrimination). See
generally WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT 127-31 (1972); Derfner, supra
note 70, at 553-55.
104. A majority-win rule requires the winning candidate to receive more than half of the votes
cast in an election. If no candidate in the general election receives a majority of votes, a run-off
election is held. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.20 (1980) ("dilutive effect of
the majority vote/runoff election scheme"); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex.
1972) (majority-vote requirement "strengthen[s] the majority's ability to submerge a political or racial
minority in a multi-member district"), aJfd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973); Derfner, supra note 70, at 553 n.125 (in absence of majority-win requirement, black
minority may win a plurality election if white vote is split).
105. Numbered post laws designate each position in a multimember election by a separate num-
ber and allow each voter to vote for only one candidate in each position. Numbered post provisions,
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provisions, ' staggered terms, 107 size of the multimember district,"'8 andlack of sub-district residency requirements., 9
3. Rebutting the Presumption of Discriminatory Effect Raised By the
Presence of Racially Polarized Voting Patterns
A showing of fairly consistent polarized voting despite the existence of
proportional representation for the minority10 raises a presumption of dis-
criminatory effect. To rebut the presumption, the defendant must show
that the minority candidates elected had received substantial support from
the minority electorate. The defendant might carry this burden by demon-
strating that the winners of primary elections from minority sub-districts
have been elected at-large, or that minority voter turnout is significantly
higher in elections where minority group members are elected than in
elections involving no minority candidate.' 1 Lack of minority voter inter-
est in a candidate of their own minority group usually indicates that the
candidate is not the candidate of their choice, but rather that minority
voters face a majority-controlled ballot from which to choose.
like anti-single shot laws, see infra note 106, and staggered terms, see infra note 107, prevent a
minority from concentrating its votes to take advantage of a split among majority group voters. See
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (numbered posts "highlight the racial
element where it does exist"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973); Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206, 213 n.9 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (explaining potential of "num-
bered seat law" to curtail minority voting power); Derfner, supra note 70, at 554-55 & n.128 (Justice
Department has objected to higher percentage of numbered place systems than any other change
submitted under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
106. Anti-single shot laws require voters to vote for as many candidates as there are offices to be
filled. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980) (defining single-shot voting);
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 217 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978) (Nevett 11) (describing how anti-single shot
voting rules discourage minority voters); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
35-39 (1968) (full-slate voting requirements may dilute black votes by forcing black voters to vote for
white candidates); Derfner, supra note 70, at 554 & n.127 (such laws deprive black voters of potential
political influence); Suitts, Blacks in the Political Arithmetic After Mobile: A Case Study of North
Carolina, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE 69 (Rockefeller Foundation Conf. Rep. 1981) (blacks elected to
county commissions in North Carolina for the first time in this century after North Carolina's anti-
single shot rule was deemed unconstitutional in 1972).
107. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 185 n.21 (1980) (staggered terms may
deny minority opportunity for single-shot voting); Derfner, supra note 70, at 555 & n.129 (staggered
terms achieve via chronological separation same end as numbered posts).
108. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3280-81 (1982) (size of at-large district burdened black
voting and campaigning).
109. See id. at 3281 (lack of residency requirement means that all candidates could reside in
"'lily-white' neighborhoods"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 n.10 (1973) (lack of residency
requirement permits all candidates to be selected from outside black neighborhoods).
110. See supra pp. 990-91 (possible coexistence of overall pattern of polarized voting and propor-
tional representation).
111. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1242 n.6 (5th Cir.) (when whites run
against whites, black voter turnout drops, indicating lack of interest in candidates), appeal dismissed
sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 102 S. Ct. 17 (1981) (case settled); c. H. PRICE, THE NEGRO
AND SOUTHERN POLITICS 77 (1957) (Negroes vote only in elections of direct meaning to them).
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B. Minority Underrepresentation
1. Relevance to Proof of Discriminatory Effect
Like racially polarized voting patterns, the less than proportional repre-
sentation of a minority group on an elected body is a valuable indicium
that the minority is unable to elect candidates of its choice. Lack of pro-
portional representation in an at-large system is not, of course, a per se
constitutional violation."' But where a minority is underrepresented in an
at-large system created or maintained for a discriminatory purpose, that
underrepresentation should satisfy the discriminatory effect component of
an equal protection claim.'
Minority underrepresentation on an elected body does not necessarily
mean that the minority is unable to elect candidates of its choice. Such a
condition could result from a situation where the minority group has no
particularized political interests or where the group perceives that its in-
terests receive adequate representation from a non-minority
representative.
Often, however, minority underrepresentation indicates that the minor-
ity is not able to elect candidates of its choice. Minority underrepresenta-
tion on governing bodies elected at-large often reflects minority adaptation
to past and present racial discrimination' 4 and perceived political weak-
112. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3288 n.21 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, 75-76 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50
(1971). The Supreme Court has, however, disfavored at-large systems in a number of contexts. See
Lucas v. Colorado Gen'l Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 (1964) (criticizing "undesirable features" of at-
large elections); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (Fairley v. Patterson)
(change to at-large system encompassed by pre-clearance provisions of § 5 of Voting Rights Act);
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (single-member districts strongly preferred in court-or-
dered districting plans).
113. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, No. 75-297-P, slip op. at 57 (S.D. Ala. April 15, 1982) (on
remand) (failure of any black to be elected to municipal government shows discriminatory effect of at-
large plan adopted for discriminatory purpose); cf Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977)
(substantial underrepresentation on a grand jury constitutes a constitutional violation if it results from
purposeful discrimination).
114. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing evi-
dence that minority group members often respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to
disassociate themselves from the group or by adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the
minority). Racial minorities may continue to fall short of realizing their political potential due to the
lingering effects of prior discrimination in voting and other areas. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct.
3272, 3279-80 (1982) (historical discrimination restricted opportunity for blacks effectively to partici-
pate in the political process); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 211 (8th Cir. 1982) (past
discrimination contributed to black underrepresentation on city's elective and appointive bodies); Hale
County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1213-14 (D.D.C. 1980) (attributing lack of black electo-
ral success to current effects of past discrimination in education and occupational and economic sta-
tus); Karnig, supra note 70, at 228 (past discrimination curtails black electoral experience and blunts
organizational potential of black candidates).
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ness. n5 First, at-large elections exacerbate the effects of low black voter
registration and voter turnout rates relative to white rates."6 Second, black
political associations may be reluctant to express open support for a candi-
date who must appeal to a white majority in an at-large system for fear
that such support would be the "kiss of death." ' 7 Third, potential minor-
ity candidates may decline to waste time and money in what they perceive
to be a futile attempt to gain sufficient white votes. 1 ' Fourth, blacks in a
solidly black area are likely to be poor, and the greater cost of at-large
election campaigns may deter candidates from poor constituencies.' 9
Even where a substantial percentage of voters "cross over" and vote for
candidates of a different race or where few or no minority group members
run for office, if a minority is underrepresented on a governing body
elected at large, then a discriminatory effect should be presumed. Minor-
ity voter support for white candidates could be the result of minority ad-
aptation to the perceived impossibility of electing minority candidates. Mi-
nority voters need not go through the motions of voting solidly for losing
minority candidates in order to show that an at-large system established
or maintained for a discriminatory purpose does not permit them to elect
candidates of their choice.
2. Measuring Minority Underrepresentation
Minority underrepresentation can be determined by comparing current
115. See-Latimer, Black Political Representation in Southern Cities, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 65, 80-81
(1979) (black voter turnout increases substantially when blacks no longer submerged in at-large
districts).
116. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 186 n.22 (1980) (voter registration data
"may perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination in the registration of voters" or reflect minority
political hopelessness); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 115 n.7 (1971) (low minority because voter regis-
tration figures reflect current effects of past discrimination); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1378
(5th Cir. 1981) (lingering effects of past exclusion of blacks from voting caused relatively lower black
voter registration rate), af'd, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); see also Morris, supra note 70, at 171 (listing
determinants of relatively low black voter turnout rates). If the minority is concentrated in one or
more single-member districts rather than in an at-large district, the minority may still be able to elect
candidates of its choice, despite its relatively low registration and turnout rates.
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980) (witnesses testified that too-conspicuous black support has been and will continue to be a
"kiss of death").
118. See City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 226 (D.D.C. 1979) (black candidates
declined to run in face of race-conscious white majority), affd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 43-44 (1981) (at-large system dis-
couraged black candidates).
119. See Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 720-21 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (multimember districts
create "radically unequal" expense problems relative to single-member districts and may eliminate
less wealthy candidates), atfd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973); Karnig, supra note 70, at 230 (at-large elections require financial resources often beyond the
means of residents of black communities); c. Goldblatt v. City of Dallas, 414 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1969) (at-large system held constitutional although it required candidates to spend more money
campaigning than would a ward system with smaller districts).
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minority representation to minority representation prior to the adoption of
the current at-large system, or by comparing the proportion of minority
group members on the elected body to the proportion of minority group
members in the multimember district's voting-age population. Where an
at-large scheme enacted with a discriminatory purpose results in a retro-
gression in minority representation, the retrogression provides ample proof
that the purposefully discriminatory scheme has achieved a discriminatory
effect.' Alternatively, if, as in Rogers v. Lodge, defendants have main-
tained an electoral system for a discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs need not
compare the current level of minority representation to its level at some
prior time in order to show that the challenged system inhibits the minor-
ity's ability to elect candidates of its choice.121 In such a situation, plain-
tiffs need only show that their minority group is not proportionally repre-
sented on the elected body.
3. Rebutting the Presumption of Discriminatory Effect Raised by the
Presence of Minority Underrepresentation
If minority underrepresentation exists but racially polarized voting is
absent, the defendant may rebut the resulting presumption of discrimina-
toryeffect by showing that such underrepresentation is not the result of
minority voter adaptation to their inability to elect minority candidates. 22
For example, the defendant could show that the minority does not have
distinct needs and interests that lead it as a group to support certain issues
and candidates. '2  Alternatively, the defendant might demonstrate that mi-
nority voters had actively supported some of the white members of the
elected government. This could be shown by election statistics indicating
that minority voter turnout in races involving only white candidates was
as high as minority voter turnout in races where a minority candidate
opposed a white candidate. 24
In a jurisdiction with a history of official discrimination in voting
rights, the defendant must show that the at-large system does not perpetu-
120. CF Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (Voting Rights Act § 5 embodies a
nonretrogression principle because House Report defined § 5 to bar any change that would diminish
"the ability of minority groups . . . to elect their choices to office").
121. The Court did not derive the Beer nonretrogression principle from the Constitution but
rather from the Court's interpretation of the intent of Congress in enacting and re-enacting § 5.
Therefore, a probable retrogression, while required to establish a discriminatory effect under § 5, is
unnecessary for satisfying the discriminatory effect component of an equal protection claim.
122. Since positive proof of "adaptive" voting behavior is elusive, see Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 180 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part), proving
the absence of "adaptive" voting behavior could be even more difficult.
123. This proof might involve showing that minority group members in the multimember district
are proportionately distributed throughout socioeconomic classes.
124. Cf supra note 111 (in the former situation, minority voters tend not to vote due to lack of
interest).
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ate the underrepresentation of minorities by enhancing the lingering ef-
fects of past official discrimination in voter eligibility or electoral struc-
ture. 121 Where blacks have suffered purposeful discrimination in the past,
it is more likely that present underrepresentation resulting from a system
established or maintained for a discriminatory purpose is caused by adap-
tive behavior that developed as a response to many forms of
discrimination.
C. Racially Polarized Voting Patterns and Minority Under-
representation
In many instances, racial bloc voting in an at-large system will cause
minority underrepresentation, 2 6 and both conditions will thus exist con-
currently. In such situations, discriminatory effect is conclusively proven,
because these conditions cannot exist together unless the minority is una-
ble to elect candidates of its choice. No imaginable confluence of circum-
stances could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that racial bloc
voting in an at-large system leading to minority underrepresentation did
not indicate that the minority group was unable to elect candidates of its
choice. Where only one factor-either polarization or underrepresenta-
tion-is present, the defendant's attempt to rebut the presumption of dis-
criminatory effect will probably rely heavily on the absence of the other
factor. 27 This avenue of rebuttal is, of course, unavailable where both
factors are present.
Conclusion
Current discriminatory effect is a necessary, but not sufficient, element
of an equal protection claim. Existing equal protection doctrine does not,
however, adequately define what discriminatory effect plaintiffs challeng-
ing an at-large electoral system must demonstrate. If plaintiffs can prove
discriminatory purpose with non-impact evidence, then proof of either ra-
cially polarized voting patterns or minority underrepresentation on the
elected body should satisfy the equal protection effect requirement. Either
125. See supra pp. 995-96 & note 114.
126. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3279 (1982) (no black ever elected to county
commission in county with racial bloc voting, despite substantial black population); id. at 3289 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (bloc voting in at-large sysatem maintained white control of local government);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183-84 & n.20 (1980) (no black ever elected to city
commission in city with racial bloc voting, despite substantial black population); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 97-98 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (same).
127. See supra pp. 994-95 (possible methods for rebutting presumption of discriminatory effect
raised by presence of racially polarized voting patterns); pp. 997-98 (possible methods for rebutting
presumption of discriminatory effect raised by presence of minority underrepresentation).
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of these conditions indicates that under the at-large system minorities are
probably unable to elect candidates of their choice.
